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‘The Medicalization of Love’ is yet another attempt by Brian Earp, Anders Sandberg and Julian 
Savulescu to convince us that we should support and pursue a research program whose goal it is to 
find out how we can modulate the physiological and neurological processes that underlie human 
love and relationships and thus to learn how to control the way we emotionally relate to other 
people: whether we feel attracted or attached to them or not, when and to what extent. In their latest 
contribution to the debate they argue a) that the medicalization of love that such a research program 
would arguably entail is, taken by itself, neither good nor bad, b) that common worries about the 
medicalization of love are misplaced or at least much less convincing than they may initially 
appear, and c) that all things considered the medicalization of love should in fact be seen as 
beneficial and indeed a welcome enrichment of our understanding of love. 
If I understand the argument correctly, then the reason why Earp and colleagues believe the 
medicalization of love as such to be unobjectionable (although they are quite aware that it can have 
negative consequences) is that we can (and should) carefully distinguish between medicalization 
and pathologization. While the latter would indeed be objectionable because it would make us see 
love, or certain instances of love, as diseases - which would then in turn create or greatly increase 
social pressures to rectify the situation - the former is not. Whereas the pathologization of a 
condition would increase the danger of “oppressive normalization and top-down control” (6), mere 
medicalization (even pharmaceuticalization), would not (or need not?) have that effect because all 
that medicalizing that condition means is that we would see it as one that, in a particular 
individual’s case, merits medical treatment, which is to say that we see it as something that 
diminishes that individual’s quality of life. ‘Treating’ the condition would then not mean curing a 
disease, but simply improving well-being by means of medical technology, which we can do 
without having to identify the treated condition as a disease with objective clinical-pathologic 
indices. In other words, if you are in love and your being in love gives you trouble (or you are not in 
love and your not being in love gives you trouble), that is, if your love-related feelings (or the lack 
thereof) make your life less good than it would be if those feelings were different, then there would 
be nothing really wrong with you. However, if you could change that situation through a particular 
medical intervention, then it would be absolutely fine for us to provide you with that opportunity, 
and for you to seize it.    
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It seems to me, though, that the strict separation of treatment and pathology, which Earp and 
colleagues believe would “further diffuse the potential problem of the pathologization of 
everything” (6) may well have the exact opposite effect. If well-being and the advancement of well-
being is all that counts and all that medicine should concern itself with (thus blurring the distinction 
between therapy and enhancement, or rather making any such distinction entirely moot), then we no 
longer have to bother trying to identify particular conditions as states of disease to justify their 
‘treatment’. Instead, everything we do and everything we are can now be regarded as fair game for 
medical interventions. As long as well-being, or our “quality of life”, can be further improved – and 
it is hard to imagine any human condition where that is not the case - there is nothing about us that 
would not fall under the remit of medicine. From here it seems not a big step to declaring, as some 
supporters of the human enhancement project are prone to do, the whole human condition to be a 
disease that is in urgent need of a cure that only radical human enhancement can provide. The 
problem with a medical focus on well-being is that well-being is not clearly defined, by which I 
mean that we can never be sure that we are well enough. Our lives can always conceivably be better 
than they are. If we are happy, there is still a possibility that we can be even happier. If we love 
someone, it is still imaginable that we may love them even more, or more intensely, or less 
selfishly, or in some other way better. And even if we rather arbitrarily declared certain emotional 
states to be good enough (which would not go well with the inherent logic of the human 
enhancement idea), it would be difficult to identify a state of love that does not at least have the 
potential to conflict with our well-being. Loving someone always holds a risk. It makes us more 
open to certain kinds of suffering. What Earp and colleagues in fact propose is that we find a way to 
keep all the good stuff that comes with love while getting rid of all the bad stuff, and perhaps that is 
just not possible because it would change the very nature of love, part of which is that it is not under 
our control (or only to a small degree) and that it makes us more vulnerable by creating the 
possibility of devastating loss. Of course it may be argued that if that is what love is then we would 
be much better off without it anyway. Clearly, although interpersonal relationships are indeed 
important for our well-being, so that there are medical benefits to improving our relationships, for 
the purpose of enhancing well-being we could just as well try to find ways to make interpersonal 
relationships less important to us. A rational risk assessment may lead us to the conclusion that by 
far the best solution to the problem of love-related troubles is to get rid of love altogether.  
But let us assume that we do not want to do that because we believe (however irrational and 
backward it may be) that a life without love would not be worth living even if we could engineer 
ourselves to be happier without it. We just want to help people improve relationships that clearly do 
not go as well as they should and that compromise their well-being, by giving them control over 
their love-related emotions. Stock examples are the woman who cannot leave her abusive husband 
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because she ‘loves’ him too much, the married couple with kids who no longer feel sexually 
attracted to or much of a bond with each other, which poses a threat to their marriage and thus to 
their own well-being and, perhaps more importantly, that of their kids, or the paedophile who feels 
sexually attracted to children because he cannot help himself, although he would rather not be. If we 
could help the woman by freeing her from the affection she feels for that man, help the couple by 
once again making them attractive to each other, or help the paedophile get rid of his unsavoury 
urges, then surely that would be a good thing. Yes, perhaps it would. However, in order to be able 
to do so, we would first have to invest heavily into the research program that the authors seem to 
support (aiming at the “neuromodulation of human love and relationships”), which, if successful, 
would allow us, and more importantly others, to control human behaviour from the inside, as it 
were, and thus far more effectively than by any other, previously available method of social control. 
If you have acquired effective means to control whom and what people love, and more generally 
how they feel about things and other people, then you have really got them under your thumb. Is 
that what we want? 
Of course we are being assured that something like that is not going to happen, and it may indeed be 
a highly unlikely outcome. The love enhancing drugs of the future are not going to work like Puck, 
who is able to make a fairy queen fall in love with anyone he chooses, even a weaver with a 
donkey’s head. They would, as Earp and colleagues hasten to clarify, “not work to create love 
magically, of course” (3). It will be more like giving someone (ourselves maybe) a gentle push in 
the right (or desired) direction, of ‘helping love along’. Maybe that is so. But if it is just that, then 
can we not simply go on doing what we have been doing all along, namely seek counselling or 
therapy, share a glass of wine with our partner, eat chocolate, have sex, or whatever else we may 
normally do to influence the way we feel? It seems that a need for the neuro-enhancement of love 
arises only if it promises to be more effective and reliable than those more traditional methods of 
self-manipulation. Why else should we want to research the matter if not in order to gain more 
control? It would be a very odd research programme indeed if we had to make sure that it didn’t 
become too successful. Yet that seems exactly the kind of research programme that we are being 
asked to endorse. What we are being told is basically that we are going to study how we can control 
our love-related emotions, but that there is nothing to worry about because it is already pretty clear 
that we won’t get very far with it. But what if we did? What if we really found ways to control 
people’s emotions effectively, would that change things? Would we then have to assess the issue 
differently if we could do more than just ‘help things along’? And if so, can we really safely 
assume, before we have even started to investigate the issue in earnest, that this is never going to 
happen?  
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Perhaps Earp and colleagues are not worried too much about the possibility that we may someday 
find ourselves in a position where (some) people actually have more control over love than we now 
think is possible. I suspect they are not because they show considerable faith in our ability to create 
social and political conditions that would render any technology, however dangerous it may 
potentially be, harmless and indeed beneficial to us. They reject technological determinism, 
meaning that they do not believe that certain social outcomes are inevitable just because certain 
technologies are available to us (6). I agree. In the present context I take this to mean that even if we 
did find ways to create love or make it disappear as if by magic (though in fact through scientific 
insight into the physiological and neurological processes that underlie our love life), then this would 
still not be a problem because we will always be able to make sure that the power that such a 
technology would give us will not be abused: if there are dangers connected to certain technologies, 
then the right response is not to avoid them altogether, but to modify the social and legal (and 
probably also moral) context in which they are likely to be used (7). Unfortunately, however, that is 
easier said than done. No doubt it could be done. But that is of course no guarantee that it will be 
done. We don’t have to subscribe to technological determinism to believe that certain technologies 
may conceivably (and even likely) lead to certain undesirable social outcomes and that one has to 
be very optimistic indeed to trust that there will be sufficient social and legal safeguards in place to 
prevent abuse. What justifies that trust? It can hardly be a belief in the essential goodness of human 
nature. 
What might explain it is simply the authors’ conviction that what we stand to gain by learning how 
to neuromodulate love outweighs the risks. Couples, they argue, should be allowed to pursue their 
“highest values” (8), whatever they may be. We should be able to choose how much we want to 
love or not love, whom we love, and when we love, depending on what we think is important to our 
(own) lives. At the core of the whole proposal is ultimately a particular, liberal moral outlook that 
values individual autonomy over everything else. I sympathize with that. Like Earp and colleagues I 
am very much in favour of upholding and promoting “a person’s ability to live her life 
‘authentically’ and in accordance with her goals and values” (8). And like them I don’t think it 
makes much sense to talk about a ‘true self’. However, I am not convinced that we can identify 
those goals and values without taking into account how and what and whom we love. What exactly 
are “my” goals and values, let alone my “highest values”? Are those goals and values in my head, 
that is, in my conscious, self-reflective mind? And are the goals and values that I find there really 
mine, or are they not rather (or also) the goals and values that the community I happen to belong to 
has injected me with. Can I really detach “my” values from the way I feel about the world and other 
people? In what way is the rational, reflective self more authentic than the emotional self (or more 
specifically the loving or not-loving self)? And by assuming that it is, do we not also assume the 
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existence of a ‘true self’? The fact is that what my highest values and goals really are is not always 
entirely clear. (Was Romeo and Juliet’s love for each other in accordance with their “highest 
values”?) Nor, for that matter, is it obvious what makes a “healthy relationship”, which love drugs 
would supposedly support by “promoting states of mind and behavioural dispositions that are 
conducive to” it” (8). Who defines what a healthy relationship is? Presumably it is one that 
promotes well-being, but what constitutes well-being for us is not independent of our goals and 
values either.  
One last point: maybe love doesn’t have to remain mysterious to be of value to us. Maybe we can 
learn to understand what exactly is going on in us when we love without losing the ability to do so. 
But how likely is it that this will enrich our love life and actually make love more beautiful, as the 
authors suggest? “What if knowing how love works (…) could help us be better at being in love?” 
(10) Earp and colleagues encourage us to practice love as an art and to appreciate the beauty in the 
processes that underlie it, which is fair enough. Yet what they have in mind is certainly very 
different from, say, the way Casanova practised the art of love and appreciated its beauty. Instead, 
our appreciation will have to be more like that of a plastic surgeon, who uses a knife to show it. 
Understanding the neurophysiology of love is one thing. Seeking to manipulate it is quite another. 
Love, as it is, takes us beyond ourselves. When we love we stop caring about what is good for us. 
Therein lies the beauty of love. Once we have learned to control it, love will be firmly tied to self-
interest, and then that beauty will be gone.  
 
